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“(I)t was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness …”
(Charles Dickens)
OPSOMMING
’n Verhaaltjie Omtrent Twee Onteienings: Newcrestia en Agrizania
’n Regsvergelyking word getref tussen die destydse belangwekkende
uitspraak van High Court van Australië in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The
Commonwealth en die onlangse Agri SA reeks van sake teen die
Departement van Minerale in Suid-Afrika. Beide die geskille het gehandel
oor die vraag of die mineraalregte/mynregte deur wetgewing, wat die
bedryf van mynbou of vervreemding van regte op een of ander wyse
verbied het, onteien word. Die artikel fokus op die betekenis wat aan die
begrippe “ontneming” en “verkryging”, as synde elemente van ont-
eiening, toegedig word. Ondanks soortgelyke feitestelle en regsbeginsels
rondom onteiening word verskillende resultate in die beslissings bereik.
Daar word gepoog om die verskillende resultate te verklaar. By afloop van
’n regsvergelykende analise word tot ’n slotsom geraak omtrent die
juistheid en wysheid van die onderskeie beslissings. 
1 Introduction
A comparison will be made between the decision of the High Court of
Australia in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth1 (“Newcrest”)
and the decisions of the South African Courts in the Agri South Africa line
of cases.2 Although the mineral law systems of the two countries differ
insofar as historical development and content,3 the simplified facts of
the Newcrest and Agri SA decisions and principles of expropriation law
are similar enough to draw an interesting comparison between the
respective cases. Both cases dealt with the issue of whether the mineral
rights/mining rights of private holders were expropriated by legislation
which prohibited mining in one way or another. A comparison between
the cases shows the approaches towards the issues and what exactly
1 (1997) 190 CLR 513.
2 Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy; Van Rooyen v Minister of
Minerals and Energy 2010 1 SA 104 (GNP) (hereafter “Agri SA I”); Agri South
Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2012 1 SA 171. (GNP) (hereafter
“Agri SA II”); Minister of Minerals and Energy v Agri SA 2012 5 SA 1 (SCA)
(hereafter “Agri SA III”); Agri SA v Minister of Minerals and Energy 2013 4 SA
1 (CC) (hereafter “Agri SA IV”).
3 See, Badenhorst “Ownership of minerals in situ in South Africa: Australian
darning to the rescue?” 2010 SALJ 646.
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constitutes deprivation and/or acquisition of property for purposes of
expropriation and whether deprivation and/or acquisition actually took
place. 
The differences between the mineral law systems of Australia and
South Africa (before the enactment of the Mineral and Petroleum
Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (hereafter “MPRDA”)) and the
protection afforded against the resumption/expropriation of mineral
rights or mining rights will be set as background information for a better
understanding of the respective decisions. The facts of the two cases will
first be set out and simplified for comparative purposes before the
respective decisions are discussed. At the end, a comparison will be
made between the decisions and a conclusion reached about the
similarity of principles and the correctness of the respective decisions.
2 Differences Between the Two Legal Systems
The mineral law systems and the protection afforded against
expropriation/resumption of mineral rights/mining rights in the two
systems differ and will be explained below.
2 1 Australia
The English doctrine of tenure applies to Australian law.4 This doctrine
is based on the principle that all land is owned by the Crown, whilst the
land is occupied by tenants holding it directly or indirectly of the Crown
by virtue of an estate in land.5 By virtue of the maxim cuius est solum eius
est usque ad coelum et ad inferos,6 all mines7 and minerals that lie beneath
the soil are presumed to belong to the owner of an estate in fee simple.8
This principle is, however, subject to qualifications. First, all mines of
gold and silver, on private or public land, belong to the Crown by royal
4 Attorney-General NSW v Brown (1847) 2 Legge 312; Milirrpum v Nabalco Pty
Ltd (1971) 17 FLR 141; Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 (CLR) 1 47;
Bradbrook, MacCallum, Moore and Grattan (2011) 41.
5 See Harpum, Bridge & Dixon The Law of Real Property (2012) 22; Butt Land
Law (2010) 83.
6 As to the origin of the cuius est solum maxim in English law, see Gray and
Gray Elements of Land law (2009) par 2.16; Griggs “Cujus est solum – an
unfortunate scrap of Latin, doctrine in disarray or a brocard of relevance?
Its applicability to the subterranean and the United Kingdom Supreme
Court decision in Star Energy v Bocardo” (19) 2011 Australian Property Law
Journal 155 156.
7 The word “mine” is used in English law either as a synonym for a vein, lode
or ore (body of material) or the location where the mineral is recovered
(Cadia Holdings (Pty) Ltd v New South Wales [2008] NSWC 528 par 21). At
present it is used as body or material.
8 Commonwealth of Australia v New South Wales (1923) 33 CLR 1 22 23 38;
Forbes and Lang Australian Mining and Petroleum Laws (1987) 14.
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prerogative.9 Secondly, ownership in minerals and mines (other than the
royal mines) could, however, have been reserved in favour of the Crown
upon the grant of a freehold estate10 which became the practice or policy
of the Crown upon the grant of freehold estates.11 Thirdly, statutes of the
Australian States reserved ownership of all or the remaining minerals in
the Crown (in right of the state).12 Thus, in Australia, the general though
not universal rule is that the Crown owns all minerals beneath the soil.13
The Crown can grant rights to third parties to explore or mine for
minerals from the land and to vest ownership of minerals in such third
parties upon severance of minerals from the land.14 Exploration rights
are rights to enter land to explore for minerals and take minerals for non-
commercial purposes. Mining rights are rights to enter land to mine or
drill for minerals and take them away for commercial purposes.15 Upon
separation of minerals from the land in accordance with the authorising
statutory right, ownership of minerals is obtained.16 In the exceptional
instances where ownership of minerals is vested in the holder of an
estate in land, a profit à prendre could be granted to another to enter the
land and mine the minerals.17 A profit à prendre is a right to take
something, such as (a) soil and minerals, (b) natural vegetation, or
(c) wild animals, from the land belonging to another person.18 A profit à
prendre is, thus, similar to a servitude in South African law.
In Australia constitutional protection of property does take place on
the federal level. The Commonwealth (Federal Government of Australia)
is empowered by virtue of section 51(xxxi) of the Commonwealth
Constitution to make laws for the acquisition of private property on just
9 The Case of Mines (R v The Earl of Northumberland) (1568) 1 Plowden 310
336; Q v Wilson (1874) 12 SCR (L) NSW 258 269-271 280 281; Millar v
Wildisch (1863) W&W (E) 37 43; Woolley v Attorney-General of Victoria
(1877) 2 App Cas 163 166-167; Cadia Holding (Pty) Ltd v New South Wales
(2010) 269 ALR 204 parr 13, 80 & 106. 
10 Forbes & Lang 17; Bradbrook et al 794.
11 Forbes & Lang 17; Crommelin “Australian Mineral Law as a Resource
Management Regime” 14 (1981) Australian Journal of Forensic Science 2 8;
Crommelin “Resources Law and Public Policy” (15) 1983 University of
Western Australia Law Review 1 3.
12 S 9(1)(b) of the Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990
(Vic); s 8(3) and 8(2) of Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld); s 16(1) of Mining
Act 1971 (SA); s 16(3) of Crown Lands Act 1976 (Tas); s 6(2)-(5) of the
Mineral Resources Development Act 1995 (Tas); s 9(1)(b) of the Mining Act
1978 (WA); s 16 of the Mining Act 1991 (SA). In the Northern Territory
reservation of ownership of all minerals was in the Crown (in right of the
Commonwealth)(i.e., the federal government) (s 3 of Minerals (Acquisition)
Act (NT)).
13 Hunt Mining Law in Western Australia (2009) 2 36.
14 See Christensen, Durrant, O’Connor and Phillips, “Regulating greenhouse
gas emissions from coal mining activities in the context of climate change”
(28) 2011 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 381 387.
15 Chambers An Introduction to Property Law in Australia (2013) 216.
16 See Christensen, Durrant, O’Connor and Phillips (28) 2011 Environmental
and Planning Law Journal 387-388.
17 Hunt 38 216.
18 Chambers 184-185.
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terms for any purpose in respect of which the Parliament has power to
make laws.19 The compensation payable in respect of the acquisition
must satisfy the requirement of “just terms”.20 The Australian States are,
by virtue of their sovereignty, empowered to take or acquire land with or
even without payment of compensation.21 
2 2 South Africa
South African law adheres to the civilian notion of full ownership
(dominium) of land (allodial title). By virtue of the maxim cuius est solum
eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos22 the owner of the land is the owner
of unsevered minerals.23 Prior to the enactment of the MPRDA, mineral
rights could, however, have been separated from the ownership of land
and acquired by another person by the creation of a separate mineral
right.24 A holder of a mineral right was entitled to go upon the land to
which the rights relate, to search for minerals, and, if he finds any, to
sever the minerals and dispose of them.25 Holders of mineral rights could
freely transfer mineral rights26 and grant prospecting or mining rights to
others by virtue of a prospecting contract or a mineral lease,
respectively.27 Before prospecting rights or mining rights could be
exercised, the necessary authorisation in the form of a prospecting
permit or a mining authorisation had to be obtained from the state in
accordance with the Minerals Act 50 of 1991 (hereafter “Minerals
Act”).28 Holders of mineral rights were not obliged to exploit the
minerals.29 Upon severance of minerals from the land, ownership of
19 See, for instance, the Lands Acquisition Act 1989 (Cth).
20 See Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1 289; Jacobs Law of
Compulsory Land Acquisition (2010) 23.
21 New South Wales v Commonwealth (1915) 20 CLR54 77; Jacobs 23.
22 As to the origin of this maxim in the South African common law, see
Franklin and Kaplan The Mining and Mineral Laws of South Africa (1982) 4.
23 London and SA Exploration Co v Rouliot (1891) 8 SC 74 91; Rocher v
Registrar of Deeds 1911 TPD 311 315; Vanston v Frost 1930 NPD; Anglo
Operations Ltd v Sandhurst Estates (Pty) Ltd 2007 2 SA 363 (SCA) 371D; Agri
SA III par 32.
24 See further, Badenhorst & Mostert, Mineral and Petroleum Law of South
Africa (2004) Revision Service 9 ch 3.2.
25 Van Vuren v Registrar of Deeds 1907 TS 289 294 295; Rocher v Registrar of
Deeds 1911 TPD 311 316; Ex parte Pierce 1950 3 SA 628 (O) 634C-D;
Erasmus v Afrikander Property Mines Ltd 1976 1 SA 950 (W) 956E; Trojan
Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 1996 4 SA 499 (A);
509G-H; Agri SA II par 23.
26 Lazarus and Jackson v Wessels, Oliver and the Coronation Freehold Estates,
Town and Mines Ltd 1903 TS 499 510; Van Vuren v Registrar of Deeds 294;
Ex parte Pierce 634C; Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg Platinum
Mines Ltd 509H.
27 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd 2011 (4) SA
113 (CC) par 65.
28 Agri SA II parr 34-36.
29 Idem 29.
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minerals was acquired by the holder of the mineral right or mining
right.30
In South Africa mineral rights (or ownership of land) could have been
expropriated in terms of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 against
payment of compensation.31 Constitutional protection of property was,
in addition, afforded by the property clause in section 28 of the (interim)
Constitution, 200 of 1993.32 Since the expiry of the term of the interim
Constitution and upon enactment of the MPRDA on 1 May 2004, section
25 of the Constitution of the RSA 1966 protects property,33 such as
ownership of land and mineral rights, as a fundamental right. Protection
of property is provided in the sense that deprivation of property may only
take place (a) in terms of law of general application, and (b) by law which
does not permit arbitrary deprivation of property.34 Expropriation, as
subspecies deprivation, of property can only take place (a) in terms of
law of general application, (b) for public purpose or in the public interest,
and (c) subject to the payment of compensation.35 Compensation must
be “just and equitable” reflecting an equitable balance between the
public interest and the interest of the expropriated owner.36 Land reform
and reform to bring about equitable access to all natural resources is
included under the notion of “public interest”.37 Section 25(5) to (9) have
a reform purpose and promote the transition of the prevalent system of
property holdings.38 In particular, the state is empowered by section
25(8) to enact legislation to “achieve land, water and related reform, in
order to redress the results of past racial discrimination”, provided it
complies with the requirements of the general limitations clause of
section 36.39 The enactment of the MPRDA by the legislature is a prime
example of such legislation. Item 12(1) of the transitional arrangements
in Schedule II of the MPRDA provides that any person who can prove
30 Trojan Exploration Co (Pty) Ltd v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 509G-510A
534F-I.
31 Agri SA IV parr 41, 43 & 46; see also De Villiers v Stadsraad van Mamelodi
1995 4 SA 347 (T); Badenhorst & Van der Vyver “Mineraalregte as voorwerp
van onteiening - De Villiers v Stadsraad van Mamelodi” 1996 TSAR 800.
32 See Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of
Property (2006) 521.
33 In terms of s 25(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
(hereafter “the Constitution”) property is not restricted to land. 
34 S 25(1).
35 S 25(2) and (3). 
36 S 25(3). See further s 25(3) as to the relevant circumstances that need to be
taken into account in the balancing of the respective interests.
37 S 25(4).
38 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert 522.
39 In terms of s 36 of the Constitution fundamental rights may be limited only
in terms of “law of general application to the extent that the limitation is
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom”. During such determination, the
following factors are taken into account: (a) the nature of the right, (b) the
importance of the purpose of the limitation, (c) the nature and extent of the
limitation, (d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose, and
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.
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“that his or her property has been expropriated” in terms of any
provision of the MPRDA, may claim compensation from the state.
3 Facts
3 1 Newcrest
The facts of Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth were briefly
as follows:40 In the Northern Territory of Australia ownership of all
minerals was reserved in favour of the Crown in right of the
Commonwealth.41 The Commonwealth granted mining leases to
Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd over parcels of land in the Northern Territory.
When self-government was accorded to the Northern Territory in 1978
the Commonwealth, broadly speaking, conferred its ownership of
minerals upon the Northern Territory,42 but retained the fee simple and
mineral interest (ownership) in the lands, over which Newcrest’s mining
leases had been granted, subject to the mining leases.43 The
Commonwealth government extended the boundaries of the Kakadu
National Park by proclamations under section 7(8) of the National Parks
and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 (Cth) to include the parcels of land
covered by the mining leases.44 The federal statute prohibited
“operations for the recovery of minerals” in the Kakadu National Park
and provided that compensation is not payable to any person by reason
of enactment of the Act.45 
3 2 Agri South Africa
The facts of Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy were
briefly as follows:46 Prior to enactment of the MPRDA, Sebenza Mining
(Pty) Ltd (“Sebenza”) was the registered holder of mineral rights to coal
in respect of two properties situated in Mpumalanga which it acquired for
R1048 000. After enactment of the MPRDA the company did not exercise
its exclusive right to apply for a prospecting or mining right and the
“unused old order right”,47 accordingly, ceased to exist. The company,
by then in liquidation, lodged a claim for compensation in terms of item
12(1) of Schedule II of the MPRDA contending that the MPRDA
expropriated its coal rights. The claim of compensation was ceded to Agri
South Africa for R250 000. Agri South Africa claimed compensation in a
40 Badenhorst “Towards a theory on publicly-owned minerals in Victoria”
(2014) 22 Australian Property Law Journal 157 177.
41 S 3 of the Minerals (Acquisition) Act 1953 (NT).
42 S 69(4) of Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978 (Cth). 
43 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth 526 546. Acquisition actually
took place in terms of s 70 of the Northern Territory (Self Government Act)
1978 (Cth).
44 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 525-
526.
45 Idem 530-531. 
46 See Agri SA II par 16 & parr 17-20; Agri SA III par 2.
47 See item 8 of Schedule II of the MPRDA.
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“test case” for the alleged expropriation of the coal rights in amount of
R750 000. The claim was rejected by the Department of Mineral
Resources. 
3 3 Simplified Facts
For purposes of a comparative analysis the facts of both cases can be
simplified as follows: 
“In Newcrest, the holder of a mining right was prohibited by statute from
mining for minerals. For all intents and purposes the mining right could not
be alienated and conveyed to another person. In other words, the holder of a
mining right was not entitled to mine or alienate its mining right because of a
(federal) statute. The statute did not provide for payment of compensation”.
In Agri SA the holder of a mineral right was prohibited by statute from
(prospecting or) mining for minerals,48 unless the mineral right was
converted into a (prospecting right or) mining right in terms of the
MPRDA. A company in liquidation, like Sebenza, could not have applied
for new prospecting or mining rights because it would not have been able
to meet the financial requirements for the application of a prospecting
right49 or mining right,50 and even if such a right were granted it would
have been terminated automatically because the holder is in
liquidation.51 The particular holder was thus prohibited by the statute to
apply for new rights because it was under liquidation. Alienation and
transfer of the mineral rights and granting of prospecting or mining right
were also prohibited by statute as these transactions could no longer be
registered in the Deeds Office.52 In other words, the holder of a mineral
right was not entitled to (prospect) or mine for minerals and to alienate or
convert its mineral rights because of a (national) statute. The statute did
provide for compensation.
Despite the similarity of the simplified facts and legal principles
regarding the elements of expropriation of property, the outcomes of the
respective decisions differ vastly.
4 Decisions
The respective decisions were as follows:
48 A holder of the unused old order right could only have prospected or mined
during the one-year interim period if it had statutory authorisation to do so
in terms of the Minerals Act, which was absent in the case of Sebenza. In
other words, upon enactment of the MPRDA Sebenza could no longer
prospect or mine.
49 S 17(1)(a) of the MPRDA requires inter alia that the applicant has access to
financial resources to conduct the proposed prospecting operations
optimally.
50 S 23(b) requires inter alia that the applicant has access to financial
resources to conduct the proposed mining operations optimally.
51 S 56(d).
52 Southern Era Resources Ltd v Farndell 2010 4 SA 200 (SCA) par 4.
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4 1 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth
One of the issues before the High Court in Newcrest53 was whether the
extension of the boundaries of the Kakadu National Park at the time of
the proclamations amounted to an acquisition of Newcrest's mining
leases without just terms in breach of section 51(xxxi) of the
Commonwealth Constitution.
It was conceded by the Commonwealth that the mining leases were
property within the meaning of section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.54 By
a majority, the High Court decided that the extension of the boundaries
amounted to an acquisition of property without just terms in breach of
section 51(xxxi) of the Constitution.
Gummow J decided that the inclusion of the mineral lease areas
amounted to (a) “an effective sterilisation” of the mining rights,55 and (b)
a denial of Newcrest’s ability to exercise its rights under the mining
leases, even though the mining leases were not extinguished.56
Gummow J accepted that the Commonwealth acquired “identifiable and
measurable advantages”, namely, the minerals were freed from the
rights of Newcrest to mine them.57 Gummow J accordingly decided that
there were acquisitions of property from Newcrest contrary to the
constitutional requirement of acquisition of property on just terms.58
Toohey59 and Gaudron JJ60 agreed with Gummow J. Kirby J held that the
outcome of the prohibition on “operations for the recovery of minerals”
in the Kakadu National Park was an acquisition of Newcrest’s mining
rights.61 Kirby J reasoned that despite the fact that Newcrest’s interests
were not expressly acquired or extinguished by any federal law, the
creation and extension of the Kakadu National Park by federal law
effectively deprived Newcrest of “the benefit of its property in the mining
tenements, principally the right to recover minerals”.62 Brennan CJ
decided when the land was included in the Kakadu National Park by
proclamation, the rights of Newcrest to carry on operations for the
recovery of minerals were extinguished. The Commonwealth acquired
property from Newcrest in the form of a “benefit of relief from the
burden of Newcrest's rights to carry on ‘operations for the recovery of
minerals’".63 Dawson J merely assumed that the proclamations together
with the statutory prohibition against mining operations “constituted the
53 Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v The Commonwealth (1998) 190 CLR 513 526;
Badenhorst (2014) 22 Australian Property Law Journal 177.
54 Idem 531 (Brennan CJ) & 573 (McHugh J). 
55 Idem 635.
56 Ibid.
57 Idem 634.
58 Idem 635.
59 Idem 560.
60 Idem 561.
61 Idem 639.
62 Idem 638.
63 Idem 530.
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acquisition otherwise than upon just terms of property held by Newcrest
in the form of the mining leases”.64 
In dissent McHugh J, however, decided as to date of judgement there
has been no acquisition of property.65 According to McHugh J the
proclamations adversely affected Newcrest’s right to mine66 and merely
impinged on Newcrest's rights to exploit their property interests,67 which
statements seem contradictory. McHugh J reasoned that even if there
was a diminution or extinguishment of all or part of the Newcrest’s
property interest, there was no gain by the Commonwealth.68 According
to McHugh J the Commonwealth gained nothing which it did not already
have.69 The Commonwealth already “owned the interests in reversion in
the minerals and the land”.70 This statement will be explained in more
detail in 5 below. According to McHugh J in “colloquial terms, Newcrest
lost but the Commonwealth did not gain”. 71
4 2 Agri SA Series of Cases 
At issue in Agri SA series of cases was whether the mineral rights of
holders of unused old order rights were expropriated by the MPRDA on
1 May 2004 (in Agri SA III the majority of the SCA considered a broader
issue, namely, did the MPRDA on 1 May 2004 expropriate all mineral
rights in South Africa?)72 The Agri SA series of cases will now be
revisited.73
These cases started with an exception being raised in proceedings
before the North Gauteng High Court in Agri SA I.74 The Department of
Minerals raised an exception against Agri SA’s claim of compensation as
not disclosing a cause of action. Hartzenberg J dismissed the exception75
and decided that “it is possible for holders of old order rights to prove that
their rights had been expropriated”.76 According to the court, the
MPRDA could be interpreted as admitting that “holders will be deprived
64 Idem 547.
65 Ibid.
66 Idem 573.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid. See also idem 527 (Brennan CJ).
71 Idem 573.
72 Agri SA III par 4. As to the reasons for such a broad sweep, see parr 3, 81 &
90.
73 See Badenhorst and Olivier “The Agri South Africa Constitutional Court
decision 2014 Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 230-232.
74 Agri SA I parr 1 & 4; Badenhorst, “Expropriations by virtue of the Mineral
and Petroleum Resources Development Act: Are there some more trees in
the forest? Agri South Africa and Van Rooyen v Minister of Minerals and
Energy” 2009 TSAR 600. See also, Van Niekerk and Mostert, “Expropriation
of Unused Old Order Mineral Rights: The Courts have its first say” 2010 Stell
LR 158; Leon, “Compensation for expropriation of ‘old order mineral
rights’” July 2011 De Rebus 47.
75 Agri SA I par 19.
76 Ibid.
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of their rights and that such deprivation, coupled with the State’s
assumption of custody and administration of those rights, constitutes
expropriation thereof”.77 The features of (common law) mineral rights
were correctly indicated78 by the court and the position of holders of
unused old order rights before and after the enactment of the MPRDA
was compared79 in order to arrive at the decision that it is possible for
holders of “old order rights” to prove that their rights have been
expropriated.80
The merits of the dispute between the parties was subsequently
decided by the North Gauteng High Court. The High Court accepted in
Agri SA II81 that coal rights constituted property for purposes of section
25 of the Constitution. The content of a mineral right was clearly
indicated by the court.82 Du Plessis J construed a deprivation as an act
which interfered with the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property.83
The content of a mineral right before and after the MPRDA84 was
compared by the court to arrive at its decision that upon enactment of
the MPRDA85 the holder of the mineral rights was deprived of its
entitlements86 and the coal rights.87 According to the court the holders
of mineral rights have, since the enactment of the MPRDA, not retained
one of the entitlements by virtue of the mineral right.88 Only the right to
acquire a new prospecting or mining right was conferred to holders of
unused old order rights by the MPRDA. 89 
For an act of expropriation to have occurred, the court in Agri SA II
required appropriation by the expropriator of the substance of a right,
and abatement or extinction of any other right held by another which is
77 Idem 17.
78 Idem 7-9.
79 Idem 5.
80 Idem 19.
81 Agri SA II par 62; Badenhorst “Large-scale Expropriation of Mineral Rights
in South Africa: The Agri South Africa saga” (2011) Australian Resources and
Energy Law Journal 261; Badenhorst and Olivier “Expropriation of ‘unused
old order rights’ by the MPRDA: You have lost it!” 2012 THRHR 329.
82 Du Plessis J stated that a holder of a mineral right was entitled to: (a) go
upon the land to prospect for minerals; (b) mine the minerals and to carry
them away; (c) alienate and transfer mineral rights, (d) bequeath mineral
rights to his heirs; (e) grant to a third party against consideration, by way of
a prospecting contract or  a mineral lease, the right to prospect for or to
mine the relevant minerals; and (f) deal with it to his benefit (see par 23 &
parr 28-30). Du Plessis J did not regard the list as exhaustive and also
referred to the list of entitlements indicated in Badenhorst and Mostert 3-12
to 3-14 (par 29).
83 Agri SA II parr 72 & 65.
84 Idem 22. As to the before-part of the comparison, see parr 23-36. As to the
after-part of the comparison, see parr 37-58.
85 Idem 75.
86 Idem 50-51.
87 Idem 77.
88 Idem 50.
89 Ibid.
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inconsistent with the appropriated right.90 The court decided that the
State acquired the substance of the former mineral rights.91 The court
concluded that the coal rights had been expropriated by the MPRDA.92
The court reasoned that, from a reading of sections 3 and 5 of the
MPRDA, the Minister was, upon commencement of the Act, “vested with
the power to confer rights, the contents of which were substantially the
same as, and in some respects, identical to, the contents of common law
mineral rights”.93 The court found that (a) the former holder of the
mineral right in respect of coal, which did not apply for new prospecting
or mining rights in terms of item 8(2) of the transitional arrangements,
was expropriated by provisions of the MPRDA, and (b) Agri SA, as
cessionary of the compensation claim, was accordingly entitled to
compensation.94 
The Minister appealed the finding of the North Gauteng High Court in
Agri SA II to the Supreme Court of Appeal (hereafter “SCA”). In Agri SA
III95 Wallis JA (with whom Heher and Leach JJA concurred) (majority of
the court) decided that all mineral rights that existed under the (repealed)
Minerals Act were not expropriated by the enactment of the MPRDA.96
A “deprivation”97 and “acquisition”98 of property by the state were
identified as defining features of an act of expropriation for purposes of
section 25(2) of the Constitution. In order to be constitutionally
compliant it was required that a deprivation had occurred in terms of a
law of general application and it should not be arbitrary.99 It was
accepted by the majority of the SCA that expropriation is a form or subset
of deprivation of property.100 In order to be constitutionally compliant an
expropriation had to be for public purpose or in the public interest and
subject to the payment of compensation.101 Wallis JA regarded
compensation as a prerequisite for a valid expropriation and a necessary
consequence thereof but not a feature to distinguish it from a
deprivation.102 According to Wallis JA the presence or absence of a
provision in a statute for compensation cannot be determinative of
whether there is an expropriation or not: “The absence of an obligation
90 Idem 78 & 80.
91 Idem 82.
92 Idem 9, 87 & 88. See, however, Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law
(2011) 438-443.
93 Idem 82.
94 Idem 88.
95 Agri SA III par 99; Badenhorst “Large-scale Expropriation of Mineral Rights
in South Africa: The Agri South Africa fiasco” 2012 Australian Resources and
Energy Law Journal 205; Badenhorst, “Expropriation of ‘Unused Old Order
Rights’ by the MPRDA: You had nothing!” 2013 THRHR 472. See further
Van der Vyver “Nationalisation of Mineral rights in South Africa” 2012 De
Jure 125.
96 Idem 90 & 99.
97 Idem 85.
98 Idem 24.
99 Idem 12.
100 Idem 14.
101 Idem 12.
102 Idem 18.
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to pay compensation is necessarily neutral, whilst its presence can never
be more than a factor that may point to an expropriation”.103
According to the majority of the SCA, deprivation is determined by
comparing the position of holders of mineral rights before and after the
changes brought about by the MPRDA.104 Wallis JA later explained: “The
comparison is between two statutory grants, namely, the rights enjoyed
under the previous statutory dispensation and those enjoyed under the
present dispensation”.105 The court a quo’s before-and-after comparison
of the position of common law holders of mineral rights was rejected as
being incorrect.106 The majority of the SCA reasoned that deprivation, as
the first element of expropriation, of property was not established107
because the right to mine was never vested in the holders of mineral
rights,108 but rather in the State.109 The majority of the SCA accepted as
the basic philosophy that “the right to mine is under the suzerainty of the
State and its exercise is allocated from time to time, as the State deems
appropriate”.110
Wallis JA was of the view that if only expropriation is contended, a
court only has to determine whether the deprivation constituted an
expropriation.111 Wallis JA accepted that acquisition of property (in its
constitutional sense) by the expropriator (or on behalf of others),
“whether directly or indirectly, that bears some resemblance to the
property that was the subject of expropriation” is one of the identifying
characteristics of an act of expropriation.112 It was regarded as
undesirable to adopt a categorical approach in determining what
constitutes acquisition for purposes of expropriation.113 Determination
of acquisition was said to take place by comparing the rights the State
held before and after the enactment of the MPRDA.114 We have seen that
the majority of the SCA was of the view that prior to the MPRDA the right
to mine was vested in the State, whilst section 3(1) MPRDA affirmed the
“principle that the right to mine is controlled by the State, and allocated
by those who wish to exercise it.”115 In other words, before and after the
MPRDA the State had the right to mine and, therefore, acquired nothing.
They accordingly found that acquisition of rights by the State, as the
second element of expropriation, also did not take place.116 The right to
103 Ibid.
104 Idem 76.
105 Idem 87.
106 Ibid.
107 Idem 85.
108 Ibid.
109 Idem 48, 84-87 & 99. 
110 Idem 69.
111 Idem 14.
112 Idem 18 & 24.
113 Idem 24. As to the difficulties which warranted this approach, see par 23.
114 Idem 76.
115 Idem 85.
116 Idem 90 & 94. 
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mine (or mineral rights) could not, therefore, have been expropriated by
the State.117 
Wallis JA found that holders of unused old order rights were not
deprived of their rights under the Minerals Act (which required
authorisation for the exercise of rights) because they not only retained a
preference to apply for a prospecting right or a mining right for a year,
but “would acquire more extensive rights if they sought and obtained a
prospecting right or mining right”.118 Deprivation would take place
according to the court upon “failure to apply for a right to exercise
them.”119 The imposition of a time limit of one year to apply for new
rights was not perceived as a deprivation of rights.120 
Wallis JA found, albeit obiter,121 that holders of old order prospecting
rights122 or old order mining rights123 who applied for conversion of
their rights were not deprived of the right to prospect or mine because of
the continuation of their prospecting or mining activities and the similar
content of present rights and previous rights.124 Expropriation of so-
called common law mineral rights did not take place due to the absence
of both the elements of deprivation and the acquisition of property.125
The fact that the involvement of the state (unlike before) is now required
by section 11(1) of the MPRDA for the transfer of converted rights and
the duration of converted rights may be less than former rights did not
influence the question whether expropriation took place.126 The reason
for this, according to the court was that the new rights are transferable
and renewable.127 Upon failure to convert these rights, the absence of
rights, rather than absence of transmissibility, was regarded by the court
as the source of loss.128
Nugent JA (with whom Mhtlantla JA concurred) concurred with the
majority of the court for different reasons.129 Despite his acceptance that
the MPRD Act extinguished common law mineral rights,130 Nugent JA
denied that common law mineral rights had as their content the “right of
exploitation”.131 According to Nugent JA, the right to prospect and mine
117 Idem 85 & 90.
118 Idem 97.
119 Ibid. If so, why did the court not find that a deprivation took place in the
case of unused old order rights where there was a failure to apply for new
rights?
120 Ibid 
121 Idem 103.
122 See item 6 of Schedule II of the MPRDA.
123 See item 7 of Schedule II of the MPRDA.
124 Idem 89-90.
125 Idem 90 & 94.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Idem 117.
130 Idem 112.
131 Idem 113.
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for minerals was stripped from the beginning by legislation.132 Only the
right to unsevered minerals was said to have remained as part of the
ownership of land.133 Although Nugent JA decided that there “can be no
doubt that the MPRD Act divested unused [old order] mineral rights of
the value that they had while the 1991 Act held sway”134 the loss of the
value of common law mineral rights was not attributed to the
abolishment of common law mineral rights.135 Nugent JA was of the
view that the extension of exploitation rights to others by the MPRDA,
which were earlier under the exclusive control of mineral right holders,
did not constitute a deprivation of property.136 
Agri SA appealed against this decision of the SCA to the Constitutional
Court (hereafter “CC”). In Agri SA IV137 Chief Justice Mogoeng (Moseneke
DCJ, Jafta J, Nkabinde J, Skweyiya J, Yacoob J and Zondo J concurring)
(majority of the CC) it was accepted that pre-existing mineral rights
constitute constitutional property.138 Mogoeng CJ, to a large extent,
recognised the true content139 and features140 of mineral rights. Apart
from the power of parliament during the period of parliamentary
supremacy to legislate on mineral matters, it was held that the state did
not have any residual competence (or substantive power) to exploit
minerals.141 Deprivation was perceived by the court as the
132 Idem 92.
133 Idem 104. It would only be correct if the mineral rights had been separated
from the ownership of land.
134 Idem 111.
135 Idem 114-115.
136 Idem 117.
137 Badenhorst “Onteiening van onbenutte ou-orde regte: Het iets niets
geword? Agri South Africa v Minister of Minerals and Energy (2013 (4) SA 1
(CC)” 2014 THRHR; Badenhorst and Olivier “Large scale Expropriations of
Mineral rights in South Africa: The Agri SA finale” 2014 Australian Resources
and Energy Law Journal.
138 Agri SA IV par 50. See also National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 2 SA
1 (CC) par 61.
139 The following “incidents” (par 7) or “essential components” (par 43) of
mineral rights were recognised by Mogoeng CJ, namely, the entitlement: (a)
to prospect, mine and dispose of minerals (ius utendi) (parr 7 & 51); (b) to
sell, lease or cede mineral rights (ius disponendi) (parr 51 & 66); (c) not to
mine or to sterilise minerals (ius abutendi) (parr 2, 43 & 66); and (d) to
encumber minerals by mortgage (parr 10 & 50). As to a list of more
entitlements of holders of minerals rights, see Badenhorst and Mostert 3-12
to 3-13; Mostert Mineral Law Principles and Policies in Perspective (2012)
136. 
140 The following features of mineral rights were recognised by Mogoeng CJ,
namely, mineral rights were: (a) registrable in the deeds office (par 12);
(b) recognised as limited real rights that are enforceable against the whole
world (par 9); (c) assets (par 10); (d) alienable by sale or lease (par 10);
(e) alienable by the grant of a prospecting contract or mining lease (par 10);
(f) transferable (par 10); (g) capable of encumbrance by mortgage or
usufruct (see par 10); (h) capable of inheritance (par 10); (i) valuable (par
41); and capable of expropriation upon payment of compensation (see par
41 & 43). As to a list of more features of mineral rights, see Badenhorst and
Mostert 3-23 to 3-24.
141 Agri SA IV par 35.
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extinguishment of a “right previously enjoyed” or the taking away of
rights or property or a significant interference with rights or property.142
Mogoeng CJ decided that holders of unused old order rights were
deprived of (a) the “free or unregulated right to sterilise mineral rights”,
(b) the “right to sell or lease mineral rights” (if such suspended right was
not revived in terms of transitional arrangements),143 and (c) their
mineral right/unused old order right (for which a prospecting right or
mining right could not be acquired in terms of the transitional
arrangements).144 It was reasoned that deprivation took place because
the MPRDA “brought about a substantial interference and limitation that
went beyond the normal restrictions on the use or enjoyment of its
property found in an open and democratic society”.145 The majority of
the CC further decided that upon failure to apply for new rights or an
unsuccessful application for new rights, the loss of mineral rights was
total and permanent.146 The possibility of Agri SA recouping the
purchase price of the mineral rights was also found to have been lost.147
The majority of the CC, thus, decided that entitlements or components of
the pre-existing mineral right were deprived by the MPRDA.148 The
assumption by the state of custodianship and the power to grant rights
which previously could only be granted by holders of mineral rights were
described as a deprivation.149 Froneman J (Van der Westhuizen J
concurring) in a separate judgement (minority judgement) also decided
that a deprivation of property took place and that such deprivation was
not of an arbitrary nature.150
For an expropriation, acquisition of entitlements or rights of property
was required by the majority of the CC.151 Determination of an
acquisition on a case-by-case basis was regarded as the most appropriate
method.152 Mogoeng CJ required that a claimant must establish that the
state has acquired the substance or core content of what it was deprived
of or similar rights.153 Exact correlation between what was lost and what
was acquired was, however, not required.154 Mogoeng CJ found that
despite the “assumption by the State of custodianship of mineral
resources on behalf of ‘all the people of South Africa’155 and the power
to grant to others rights156 that could previously have been granted by
142 Idem 48.
143 Idem 51. See also parr 2 & 66.
144 Idem 66.
145 Idem 67.
146 Idem 52.
147 Ibid.
148 Idem 53.
149 Idem 68.
150 Idem 92.
151 Idem 48.
152 Idem 64.
153 Idem 58.
154 Ibid.
155 In terms of s 3(1) of the MPRDA.
156 In terms of s 3(2) of the MPRDA prospecting rights or mining rights can
inter alia be granted by the Minister.
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holders of mineral rights”, the state did not acquire any mineral rights
(including those of Sebenza) at commencement of the MPRDA.157
Mogoeng CJ found that “(n)either the state nor other entities or people
acquired the rights to sterilise, monopolise the exploitation of minerals
or sell, lease or cede Sebenza's old order rights on 1 May 2004”.158
Despite the termination of the right by the state, a transfer to the state
did not take place.159 The appeal was dismissed.160 Cameron J also
concurred with the majority of the CC but decided that acquisition by the
state is not a necessary feature of an expropriation under section 25 of
the Constitution.161 
Froneman J, however, did decide that the state acquired the “power of
disposition that private mineral ownership entailed”,162 “power to
allocate and dispose of the exploitation rights”163 or “at least some of the
powers and competencies”164 of holders of unused old order rights. The
minority of the CC also decided that acquisition of property by the state
is not an essential requirement for expropriation.165 The appeal was,
however, also dismissed by the minority of the CC who decided that the
transitional arrangements, as “compensation in kind”, constituted “just
and equitable compensation” as required in terms of section 25(3) of the
Constitution.166
5 Comparison
The courts in Newcrest and the Agri SA line of decisions recognised
mineral rights/mining rights worthy of protection under their respective
Constitutions. These courts required deprivation and acquisition as
elements of an act of expropriation/resumption. We have seen that only
the minority of the CC in Agri SA IV and Cameron J did not require
acquisition as an element of expropriation. 
Deprivation, as perceived by these courts, varied from interference
with the exercising of entitlements, sterilisation of entitlements,
prohibition of the exercising of entitlements and extinguishment of
entitlements of mineral rights/mining rights. The views of the respective
courts as to what constitutes a deprivation were basically the same. In
order to determine whether deprivation has taken place, one has to be
able to identify the content of the mineral right or mining right and do a
157 Agri SA IV parr 68 & 71.
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid. Insofar as expropriation is an original mode of acquisition of rights,
transfer of rights does not, strictly speaking, take place.
160 Idem 76.
161 Idem 78.
162 Idem 80.
163 Idem 81.
164 Idem 106.
165 Idem 79 & 102.
166 Idem 79, 88 & 90.
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proper before-and-after analysis of the content of such right with
reference to the statute in question. 
The content of a mineral right was determined or largely recognised
by the respective courts in Agri SA I, II and IV. The same can be said for
the determination of the content of a mining right in Newcrest. The
majority of the High Court in Newcrest, in effect, decided that the holder
of the mining right was deprived of the entitlements of a mining right,
and more particularly the entitlements to mine or recover minerals. A
similar approach was followed in Agri SA I and II and IV. The denial by
(a) the majority of the SCA in Agri SA III that: (i) the “right” to mine base
minerals in the former Transvaal prior to167 and during168 the existence
167 Idem 48. Wallis JA ascribed to the view of Mostert (20) that: “The right to
seek for and extract minerals was, however, in many respects, the
prerogative of the state” (par 48). In her discussion of the period of 1860 to
1964 Mostert clearly indicates that the right to prospect and mine for base
minerals in the Transvaal remained vested in the owner of land (see parr
29-30). Mostert’s statement is only applicable to the right of the state to
prospect and mine for natural oil and the right to mine for precious stones
and precious metals. Only those rights, held by governments of the
Republics and Colonies, were vested in the Governor-General-in-Council by
s 123 Union of South Africa Act 1909 (see par 53) and not the right to mine
all minerals (including base minerals) in the Union of South Africa. The
same can be said about other Union mining legislation to which Wallis JA
referred (parr 53-56). Those statutes did not vest the right to mine base
minerals in the state. The general statements of Wallis JA about the right to
mine minerals did not reflect the correct position in respect of base
minerals. If Mostert’s use of the term prerogative can be construed as a
prerogative power it can be noted that it was recently decided in General
Council of the Bar v Mansingh (2013 3 SA 294 (SCA) par 18) that the royal
prerogative power was retained in Union of South Africa by s 8 of the Union
of South Africa Act 1909 and s 4 of the Status of the Union Act 69 of 1934
and its ambit had to be determined by English law. The prerogative power
was partially codified by s 7(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa Act 32 of 1961, whilst the uncodified prerogative powers were
preserved by s 7(4) (par 20). Even if the English prerogative to minerals was
retained in South Africa (and not changed by mining legislation) the
Crown’s prerogative right did not extend to base metals (see Commonwealth
v New South Wales (1923) 33 CLR 1 58; Cadia Holdings (Pty) Ltd v New South
Wales (2010) 269 ALR 204 par 17).
168 According to Wallis JA, only the “entitlement to exercise the right to mine”
was vested in the holder of a base mineral right by the Mining Rights Act,
whilst the state held the “entitlement to control and allocate the right to
mine” par 61. It is submitted that this would mean if the State had such
entitlement it must have been the holder of the right to mine base
minerals, which is clearly not correct. Wallis JA relied on a statement by
Mostert (55) that: “The philosophy of state control over minerals during the
period 1964 to 1990 resulted in a system whereby the state, in which the
right to mine was vested, conferred rights to mine and prospect to mineral
rights holders” (par 61). Mostert, in turn, relied on Kaplan and Dale A Guide
to the Minerals Act 1991(1992) 5. Kaplan and Dale referred to such
philosophy in regard to natural oil, precious metals and precious stones
where the right to mine was indeed vested in the State. They indicated that
in these instances the state granted subordinated rights (and not mere
licences or authorisations) to third parties to mine. The statement of
Mostert does not apply to all minerals during this period. It is only
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of the Mining Rights Act 20 of 1967; (ii) the “right” to mine minerals
during the existence of the Minerals Act;169 and (b) the minority of the
SCA that the entitlements of mineral rights170 were vested in the holder
of mineral rights, was used as a basis for its decision that no deprivation
(or acquisition) of property took place. The denials were not only
contrary to the express provisions of the relevant statutes,171 but also
more than a hundred years of case law172 which recognised the content
of mineral rights. We have seen, in determining the question of whether
expropriation took place, that features of former mineral rights, such as
being unrestricted in duration and transferable, were also disregarded by
Wallis JA in Agri SA III. Once the well-established content and some of
the features of a mineral right were disregarded by the SCA, the question
of whether deprivation took place becomes nonsensical because the
former mineral right becomes devoid of much of its content and features.
For argument’s sake, even if the content of a mineral right or mining
right is restricted to the entitlement to prospect, mine and remove
minerals and to alienate or dispose of the mineral right or mining right,
it is clear that a statute which prohibited the mining of minerals and the
168 applicable to the right to mine precious metals and precious stones and the
right to prospect and mine natural oil. It is not applicable to base minerals
in which case the right to mine was vested in the holder of mineral rights.
Mostert (48) clearly maintained earlier that the common-law position
applied to base minerals. 
169 Even though the vesting of the right to mine was recognised by Wallis JA it
was said to be subject to obtaining statutory authorisation (parr 64 & 66).
Unfortunately, Wallis JA did not distinguish between the vesting of a right
and the exercise of a right (although regulation during the exercise of a right
is recognised at par 66). Only the exercise of the (acquired) right was
regulated by the Minerals Act. The rejection by Wallis JA (parr 63-67) of the
view that s 5(1) of the Minerals Act amounted to a privatisation of state-held
rights to precious metals, precious stones and natural oil (or a restatement
of the common law position) (see Kaplan and Dale 5-6 46-48; Badenhorst
“The revesting of State-held entitlements to exploit minerals in South
Africa: Privatisation or deregulation?” 1991 TSAR 113 124–125) did not
apply to base minerals. The vesting of the entitlements to prospect for and
mine base minerals in the holder of a base mineral right remained
unchanged. Only the regulation of the exercise of the right to base minerals
was increased by the Minerals Act (see further, Badenhorst 2013 THRHR
479).
170 Agri SA III par 104.
171 For the wording of statutes of the former South African Republic, Transvaal
colony and province, see Badenhorst and Mostert 1-16 to 1-20. S 2(1)(b) of
the Mining Rights states expressly that “the right of and mining for and
disposing of base minerals on any land is vested in the holder of the right to
base minerals in respect of the land”. S 5(1) of the Minerals Act states:
“[T]he holder of the right to any mineral in respect of land shall have the
right to enter upon such land ... together with such persons, plant or
equipment as may be required for purposes of prospecting or mining and
to prospect and mine for such mineral on or in such land and to dispose
thereof” (italicised).
172 See 2 2 above and cases cited in n 25 above.
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alienation/transfer of the underlying right173 is interfering to such an
extent with such rights that it constitutes a deprivation. It is submitted
this happened in Newcrest and the Agri SA line of cases. 
For purposes of acquisition it seems that the cases required that the
state acquires some entitlements of a mineral right/mining right or
something which resembles these entitlements or some form of
property. For present purposes the question as to what constitutes
property in Australia and South Africa is not further discussed. The views
of the respective courts as to what constitutes acquisition were basically
the same. The majority in Newcrest found that such acquisition took
place. In Agri SA II it was correctly found that an acquisition of former
entitlements of the holders of mineral rights took place in favour of the
state. It was shown that some of these entitlements were now vested in
the state. The majority in Newcrest used a further criterion which could
have been useful in the Agri SA line of decisions, namely, whether the
advantages or benefits of a right or property were acquired by the
expropriator.174 In Newcrest it was found that the advantage or benefit
lies therein that the mineral interest of the Commonwealth was no longer
burdened by a mining right in favour of Newcrest. It was consequently
correctly decided that a resumption (expropriation) took place. 
As indicated above, the minority of the High Court in Newcrest also
decided that even if there was a deprivation of entitlements of a mining
right, acquisition thereof did not take place because the Crown already
owned the “interest in reversion in the minerals and the land”. This
reminds one of the thinking of the SCA in Agri SA III: the state cannot
acquire something which it already holds. This minority view in Newcrest
requires some further explanation of the English tenurial system:175 If,
for instance, the holder of a fee simple title (which endures indefinitely
in time) grants a life estate (which only endures for the duration of a life)
for the life of a grantee and the surplus of the life estate is not dealt with,
a so-called reversion interest is created presumptively in favour of the
original grantor. In short, the grantee holds a life estate whilst, the
grantor holds a reversion interest in the estate. Upon death of the
grantee, the grantor regains the (full) fee estate simple because he was
holding the reversion interest. The same construction applies to the grant
of a mining right by the owner of the mineral interest in the land. In the
present case the Commonwealth granted a mining right to Newcrest but
retained the reversion interest in the minerals. In short, the grantee holds
173 We have seen that Wallis JA, in Agri SA III, disregarded transferability of
rights in the determination of whether expropriation took place because
converted rights are capable of transfer with ministerial consent (par 91).
Due to it being in liquidation, however, it was not possible for Sebenza to
convert its mineral rights.
174 This test was, however, rejected by Wallis JA in Agri SA III because it
“ignores the reality that deprivations of property can take different forms
and be effected in various different ways” (par 23).
175 See Hepburn Australian Property Law Cases, Materials and Analysis (2012)
231-233.
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a mining right (for the duration of the mining lease), whilst the grantor
holds a reversion interest in the minerals. Only upon expiry of the term
of the mining lease would the mining right or entitlements have been
regained by the Commonwealth due to it holding the reversion interest
in the minerals.176 Whilst, McHugh J was correct in deciding that the
Commonwealth retained the reversion interest in the minerals, he was
incorrect in deciding that no acquisition took place. At issue was not the
acquisition of the reversion interest in the minerals but the entitlements
(or incidents) of the mining right which was granted by the
Commonwealth to Newcrest. As correctly indicated by the majority of
the High Court, the holder of the mining lease was deprived of the
entitlements of the mining right which were acquired by the
Commonwealth. There was, indeed, a gain by the Commonwealth. The
Commonwealth no longer had the mining right or entitlements by virtue
of such a right during the duration of the lease. Because of the statute the
mining right was acquired (prior to the expiry of the term of the lessee’s
mining right). The existence of the Newcrest’s mining right (or
entitlements thereof) was (incorrectly) not perceived or recognised by
McHugh J.
Wallis JA did refer to and provided a brief summary of the Newcrest
decision in Agri SA III. The decision of McHugh J is summarised as
follows:
“(I)n dissent, McHugh J pointed out that the Commonwealth gained nothing
thereby. It was not enabled to exploit the minerals and, had the [statutory]
prohibition [on the recovery of minerals] been lifted, the claimant could have
exploited them under the mineral leases. He accordingly held that there was
no acquisition”. 177
It is submitted that, as seen before, McHugh J rather reasoned that
acquisition was absent because of the presence of the Commonwealth’s
mineral interest reversion and not because of a statutory prohibition. Just
like McHugh J, Wallis JA denied that acquisition by the State had taken
place because the State always had the right to mine. As indicated before,
in the case of Newcrest the mineral interest reversion was held by the
Commonwealth but the right to mine was deprived and acquired by the
Commonwealth because of the statutory prohibition against mining in
the National Park. Whilst McHugh J was correct about the
Commonwealth already holding the mineral interest reversion, Wallis JA
was not correct in holding that the right to mine has always vested in the
State. Even if the right to mine was vested under the (newly discovered)
176 In passing, it can be mentioned that in identifying the content of a mineral
right in the South African system the grant of a prospecting or mining right
to another person by a mineral right holder was explained by reference to a
reversionary entitlement that was held by the holder of a mineral right.
Upon termination of the prospecting right or mining right, the mineral right
expanded back to its original content by virtue of the residuary entitlement.
177 Agri SA III par 22.
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suzerainty or public power of the State,178 allocation and vesting of
mineral rights and or entitlements thereof took place by virtue of deeds
registration legislation and mining legislation. Whilst, a form of a right to
mine may have been under the suzerainty of the State, the allocated
mineral rights or entitlements (to base minerals) were not vested in the
State, and holders were deprived thereof and these allocated rights or
entitlements were acquired by the State upon enactment of the MPRDA.
Just as McHugh J failed to recognise acquisition of Newcrest’s mining
right by the Commonwealth because he erroneously focussed on the
mineral interest reversion, Wallis JA failed to see the deprivation and
acquisition of Sebenza’s mineral right because he erroneously focussed
on the so-called right to mine which was claimed to have been vested in
the State by virtue of its suzerainty. 
We have seen that the CC in Agri SA IV recognised a deprivation of
entitlements, but the majority of the CC could not recognise the
acquisition of these entitlements by the State (on behalf of future
applicants). It was reasoned that acquisition does not take place in terms
of the construction that the state is merely the custodian and allocator of
mineral resources. The view of the majority of the CC can be attributed
to its view on the need for transformation of the mining industry due to
the inability of the majority of black South Africans to benefit directly
from the exploitation of mineral resources by reason of their
landlessness, exclusion and poverty caused by apartheid.179 The
transformative nature of the MPRDA180 and section 25 of
Constitution181 was indicated by the court. According to the majority of
the CC, section 25 imposed an obligation not to over-emphasise property
rights at the expense of the state’s social responsibilities.182 Mogoeng CJ
was of the view that if a proper meaning is given to the notion of
acquisition for purposes of section 25(2) of the Constitution, it “should
pose no threat to the possibility of maintaining a sensitive balance
between existing private property rights and the pursuit of
transformation that s 25 was designed to facilitate”.183 Such proper
meaning should, according to Mogoeng CJ, not be too narrow or too
wide. If the meaning is too narrow, it could work against the
constitutional protection sought to be given to property; if the meaning
is too wide it could: (a) blur the line drawn by the Constitution between
deprivation and expropriation;184 (b) “undermine the constitutional
imperative to transform our economy with a view to opening up access
to land and natural resources to previously disadvantaged people” as
178 In Agri SA IV, Mogoeng CJ, however, correctly stated: “It is, however, not
clear what is meant by the proposition that the ‘right to mine’ is a matter of
the ‘substantive powers’ of the state, or something under its ‘suzerainty’”
(par 35).
179 Agri SA IV par 1. See further par 22.
180 Idem 2, 26 & 65-66.
181 Idem 60-61.
182 Idem 62.
183 Idem 63.
184 Ibid.
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envisaged by section 25(4) of the Constitution;185 (c) “affect the need to
create jobs, grow the economy by developing these resources in a
sustainable way”, and (d) “guarantee security of tenure to those
prospecting for or exploiting mineral and petroleum resources”.186 The
MPRDA does have security of tenure187 of prospecting and mining
operations as one of its objectives.188 Mogoeng CJ reasoned that a
finding of expropriation would have disregarded the public interest and
constitutional imperative to transform and facilitate equitable access to
mineral resources.189 It is not explained why expropriation with
compensation cannot take place during constitutionally mandated
transformation which provides for compensation.
The minority of the CC acknowledged that the state acquired some of
the entitlements of holders of unused old order rights190 which is in line
with the Newcrest decision and in line with legal reality. The attempt by
the minority of the CC to dump acquisition of entitlements as a
requirement of expropriation is not serving much of a purpose, given
that they did recognise the acquisition of entitlements by the State but
reasoned that the loss was, in any event, compensated. The fact that the
majority of the CC was not able to recognise the acquisition by the State
is more a cause for concern, which is apparent from the following
statement by Froneman J:
“If private ownership of minerals can be abolished without just and equitable
compensation – by the construction that when the state allocates the
substance of old rights to others it does not do so as the holder of those rights
– what prevents the abolition of private ownership of any, or all, property in
the same way?”191
The denial by the CC of any acquisition whatsoever defies legal reality
and logic insofar as an entitlement without an encompassing right,
whether public or private in nature, or a right not being held by anybody
is not possible. The fact that the State is, since enactment of the MPRDA,
capable of granting rights to minerals to applicants can only mean that
the State acquired former rights or entitlements or (as a conduit) is
holding them on behalf of future successful applicants.192 Or, in the
words of Mogoeng CJ, there was actually some correlation between what
was lost and what was indeed acquired. The entitlements to exploit
mineral rights that were lost do correlate with the rights to minerals that
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 According to Otto “Security of Mineral Tenure: Time-Limits”, in Bastida,
Wälde and Warden-Fernandez (Eds) International and Comparative Mineral
Law and Policy (2005) 353 362, security of mineral tenure broadly means
the stability of rights granted to an investor to implement the three phases
of the mining sequence, namely, exploration, development and mining.
188 S 2(g) and item 2(a) of Schedule II of the MPRDA.
189 Agri SA IV par 69.
190 Idem 106.
191 Idem 105.
192 See Badenhorst 2014 THRHR.
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the State is empowered in terms of the MPRDA to grant to applicants. If
the advantage test of Newcrest had been applied, the majority of the CC
would have had to recognise that the State has acquired the benefit of
Sebenza’s former “mining land” free from the encumbrance of its
mineral rights and could now grant new prospecting rights and mining
rights to applicants. That advantage had clearly shifted because the
MPRDA prohibited Sebenza from mining unless its mineral right was
converted (which was not legally possible). The same decision as the one
in Newcrest should have been arrived at in Agri SA III and IV. The
compensation provided for in the Constitutional property clause and
item 12 of schedule II of the MPRDA should have made it even easier to
arrive at such a decision.193 We have seen that the majority of the SCA
in Agri SA III accepted that the presence of compensation is a factor that
may point to an expropriation.194 The fact that item 12 of the transitional
arrangements made provision for compensation was, however,
dismissed as follows by Mogoeng CJ in Agri SA IV:
“That the MPRDA does make provision for expropriation was, in my view,
more of a cautious approach to provide for unforeseeable eventualities, than
an acknowledgment or reinforcement of an accepted reality that the MPRDA
necessarily has signposts of expropriation”.195 
Despite the absence of a provision of compensation, the High Court in
Newcrest nevertheless recognised that resumption took place. Such
recognition enhanced the security of mineral tenure on the federal level
in Australia. Despite the presence of a property clause and a statute
authorising payment of compensation, the SCA and CC in the Agri SA line
of decisions did not recognise that expropriation took place. These
decisions do not enhance security of mineral tenure196 nor the sanctity
of constitutional property in South Africa.
6 Conclusion
Despite differences between the Mineral law of Australia and South
Africa (prior to the MPRDA), a useful comparison can be drawn between
the Newcrest decision and the Agri SA line of decisions. Both cases dealt
with the issue of whether holders of mineral rights/mining rights were
expropriated by a statute which in effect prohibited mining of minerals
and alienation of rights. The Australian statute did not provide for a claim
of compensation, whereas, the South African statute did. The decisions
were arrived at by looking at the content or entitlements (or incidents) of
mineral rights or mining rights, and the meaning of deprivation and
193 Van der Vyver 2012 De Jure 142 states: “Since the MPRDA was enacted for a
noble cause, one would have expected a court of law to lean toward a
finding of expropriation, as indeed dictated by the provisions of s 25 of the
Constitution” (see also Froneman J (par 80)).
194 Agri SA III par 18.
195 Agri SA IV par 74.
196 See further, Badenhorst “Security of mineral tenure in South Africa: Carrot
or stick?” 2014 (32.1) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 5.
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acquisition as elements of an act of expropriation under both systems.
The views as to what constitute acts of deprivation and acquisition were
similar. Deprivation was perceived as an interference with/prohibition of
the exercise of entitlements, sterilisation of entitlements, or
extinguishment of entitlements of mineral rights/mining rights. For
purposes of acquisition, it was required that the State acquires some
entitlements of a mineral right/mining right, something which resembles
these entitlements, benefits or some form of property. Even though the
simplified facts of the two cases and views about deprivation and
acquisition were largely the same, the views of the courts differed as to
whether deprivation and/or acquisition of property actually took place.
In Newcrest the majority of the High Court recognised that deprivation
and acquisition of entitlements, rights or advantages by the
Commonwealth took place. The findings and reasoning of the majority
of the High Court in Newcrest cannot be faulted. The object of the statute
was achieved, namely, nature conservation by prohibiting mining in a
National Park. A National Park was extended for the benefit of all
Australians. Despite the absence of a statutory compensation claim,
security of mineral tenure was enhanced. 
In Agri SA II the content of mineral rights and deprivation and
expropriation of mineral rights by the State were recognised. The
outcome of the decision was that the object of the statute was achieved,
namely, transformation of the mineral right holding of the past, whilst
the expropriation of holders of mineral rights was recognised and
compensated. Fair transformation was achieved. 
However, in Agri SA III the Supreme Court of Appeal sadly refused to
recognise the existence of the well-defined content of mineral rights, or
the deprivation and acquisition of rights or entitlements which took
place. These aspects should have been apparent to a reader of Mineral
law. In Agri SA IV the content of mineral rights was largely resurrected
and the deprivation of entitlements or mineral rights was not denied by
the CC. Nevertheless, the majority of the CC still denied that acquisition
thereof by the State took place because of the transformation objectives
of the MPRDA and the property clause itself. Denial of acquisition
entitlements was based upon the adoption of the custodian construction.
Apart from cost implications, it is unclear why expropriation with
compensation, as provided for in item 12(1) of Schedule II to MPRDA and
section 25 of the Constitution, cannot take place during such
transformation. Security of mineral tenure of unused old order rights and
new prospecting and mining rights was also not enhanced. Even if the
acquisition of entitlements or rights could not have been recognised by
the CC, a sound principle could have been derived from the Newcrest
decision, namely, that the State acquired the benefit of “mineral land”,
freed from the former unused old order rights in respect of which new
prospecting and mining rights could be granted by the State. The
objective of the statute was achieved by the outcomes of Agri SA III and
IV, namely, as part of the transformation of the former mineral holding
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in South Africa by imperceptible enlargement of the fiscus for eventual
“distribution” by the State to “worthy” applicants. Transformation was,
however, achieved at the expense of former holders of unused old order
mineral rights and security of mineral tenure despite the protection
afforded by the constitutional property clause and item 12(1) of Schedule
II to the MPRDA. Valuable assets were taken without compensation and
the fine balance between protection of property and transformation was
not maintained. Rectifying the injustices of the past by denying the
expropriations of today did not further the protection of property under
the property clause in South Africa. The true content of mineral rights of
the old order and the value of the academically much-vaunted property
clause of the South African Constitution has largely been undermined by
the SCA and the CC, respectively. 
